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1 Introduction 
 
Although the Treaty on European Union is, in many respects, an ambitious blueprint for European 
integration, it has little to say about a number of areas of public policy. In some of these areas, no clear 
guidance is given about whether responsibility for policy should remain with Member States or be re-
assigned to the supranational tier. By contrast, the assignment of competences is entirely explicit in 
other fields. Thus, monetary union will see the transfer of responsibility for monetary policy from 
Member States to the European Central Bank (ECB), while fiscal policy will remain with Member 
States. The uncertainty surrounding the future assignment of policy is most pronounced in areas in 
which the EU tier has had little to offer in the past (for example, industrial policy) or in which 
integration is, itself, engendering new policy demands. In the latter category, cross-border regulation is 
an instance of an issue which arises because of the consequences of integration. 
 
The ECB, acting together with national Central Banks in what will be known as the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB), will also have related responsibilities for assuring the viability of the 
European financial system. Yet even here there is ambiguity about where responsibilities will lie for 
different functions. Prudential supervision of banks - controls designed to assure the capital adequacy 
and liquidity of banks - is a good illustration of this. Thus, article 105 (5) of the Treaty states that the 
ESCB `shall contribute to ... prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the 
financial system' and in 105 (6) there is reference to the possibility that the ECB may be asked to 
undertake specific tasks in relation to `prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial 
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings'. In the transition to EMU, the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI), which is the precursor to the ECB, is given the right to hold consultations on 
`issues falling within the competence of the national central banks and affecting the stability of 
financial institutions and markets' (article 109f). 
 
  1.1 Why the issue matters 
 
The banking system plays a central role in the operation of a modern economy both by providing the 
basis for payments and by acting as the principal intermediary between lenders and borrowers. As such 
it occupies a position similar to the electricity supply or telecommunications networks as a vital part of 
the economic infrastructure. If the stability of the system is undermined, considerable disruption can 
result, and, as recent experience in Scandinavia and the US (the savings and loans crisis) shows, a 
breakdown in the banking system can have substantial effects on the real economy.  
 
For these reasons, banking is generally regarded as an industry that needs to be regulated with 
sensitivity. Bank regulators need to tread a careful path between controls which assure the stability of 
the financial system and over-bearing regulation which stultifies competition and efficiency. 
Regulation is further complicated by the parallel controls on banks that stem from the operation of 
monetary policy. Hitherto in the EU, both bank regulation and monetary policy have been competences 
of Member States. However, with responsibility from monetary policy being re-assigned to the 
supranational tier, it is reasonable to ask whether it would be rational also to re-assign responsibility 
for bank regulation, and particularly prudential supervision. 
 
  1.2 The current position 
 
The motivations for prudential controls differ from country to country, reflecting both the historical 
development of regulatory practice and the character of their financial systems.  In some countries, 
public ownership of major financial institutions predominates.  Some countries have centralised 
financial systems in which major financial groups play a leading role, while in others, the system is 
fragmented either regionally or by type of service.  Differences between countries in legal, political 
and institutional arrangements are compounded by contrasting market structures in financial services.  The manner in which the financial system has developed in any country is, inevitably, linked to its 
history, culture and pattern of development.  As Khoury (1990) points out of the US system of 
regulation: it `is based on an archaic collection of laws and regulations formulated in reaction to 
financial, economic and political crises.'  The existing framework for prudential supervision, in short, 
is as much the result of historical accident as of the application of economic principles. 
 
Within the EC, there are differences between Member States in both the institutional structures for, and 
the aims of, prudential supervision.  As the table shows, the Central Bank takes the lead in roughly half 
the Member States, while a separate authority undertakes the main supervisory duties in the others. 
Even for the latter group, however, the Central Bank, as in France, has a substantial role in supervision. 
In Denmark, supervision of banks is carried out by an agency responsible for all financial services 
under the Ministry of Industry, while in Luxembourg, the Institut Monétaire Luxembourgeois has been 
neither a fully fledged Central Bank, nor a specialist banking commission (although the IML is 
changing because of EMU). 
 
These supervisory structures have evolved considerably in the last decade (OECD, 1992), with a 
general tightening of prudential controls.  There is evidence of a convergence in approaches (Gardener 
and Molyneux, 1990), helped by the agreement and adoption of international standards, such as the 
Cooke rules for capital adequacy, although major differences in supervisory methods remain. These 
concern such matters as the extent to which on-site inspections rather than examination of statistical 
returns is used, the role of external auditors, bank authorisation (that is, market entry) and recourse to 
closure.  There are also substantial variations in deposit insurance schemes or in the legal liability of 
the regulators. Nevertheless, the trend is towards a de facto harmonisation. 
 
  1.3 Options for a European approach 
 
Various reasons can be put forward for advocating an increased role for the European tier in any policy 
area, including those affecting the European financial system. Equally, there are pragmatic arguments 
against such a transfer of powers. To the extent that the Member States recognise some common 
ground, three broad approaches might be envisaged: 
 
  •  No change in the current assignment of responsibilities between tiers of government, but 
establishment of procedures for co-operation between Member States. In essence, this is the case for 
fiscal policy and the régime of direct taxation to which finanical intermediaries are subject. 
 
  •  Setting-up of formal co-ordination mechanisms so that national administrations are tied in by rules. 
These can be reinforced by new institutions, a possible example being the European Monetary Institute, 
albeit for a transitional period. 
  •  Assignment of new competences to the EU tier, possibly to complement the activities of parallel 
policy agencies in Member States, but typically requiring the creation of new institutions. For 
monetary policy, this, broadly is what will happen with the establishment of the ECB and the ESCB. 
 
In practice, `policy' comprises a variety of functions and activities by public agencies, so that a rigid 
demarcation of this sort is unlikely. A disjunction may, for example, be envisaged between the 
strategic choices and rule-setting for policy, and its implementation. For prudential supervision, this is 
likely to be of particular relevance in view of the need for supervisors to establish close and productive 
links with the intermediaries under their jurisdiction. 
 
  1.4 Broad trends in European banking 
 
As the opening sentence of a recent OECD (1992) report on the banking sector notes, `recent 
developments in the banking world have been turbulent.' Perhaps the most pervasive trend has been the 
progressive internationalisation of financial markets, a trend which has transformed the previously 
cosy relationships between leading banks and their respective national authorities. The advent of the 
single market and the enactment of the Second Banking Directive reinforced this trend in two ways. 
First, it made it easier for banks from one Member State to set up branches or subsidiaries in others. Second, it prompted a wave of takeovers and alliances, as a result of which a few large banking groups 
are gradually becoming multi-national entities. 
 
Other trends which radically alter the nature of the banking and finance industries also set new 
challenges for prudential control. These include: the integration of traditional banking activity and 
other market areas such as securities business or insurance, resulting in so-called universal banks; 
changes in the nature of the risks facing financial intermediaries; and the process of `disintermediation' 
- lenders and borrowers coming together without making use of a financial intermediary. The internal 
organisation and procedures of financial entities have also evolved rapidly with ever-greater use of 
information technology. One outcome has been a proliferation in `products' specifically designed for 
particular market segments.  
 
  1.5 Structure of the paper 
 
The next section of this paper reviews the case for supervision of banks and other credit institutions. 
The following section outlines a series of new problems for prudential supervisors and reviews recent 
relevant experience in the United States and elsewhere. The discussion then turns to an assessment of 
the arguments surrounding the extent of the involvement that an EU tier of government should have in 
this arena. Finally, a number of conclusions and proposals are presented. 
 
 
2  Why supervise: the nature of risks etc 
 
Any form of regulation has to strike a balance between competing objectives, and prudential 
supervision is no exception. It is argued that controls are needed to deal with market failures arising 
from asymmetries in information and risks emanating from moral hazard, and the wider 
macroeconomic implications of bank failure, notably systemic risk (for a succinct exposition, see 
Tirole, 1994). At the same time, prudential controls need to be light enough to ensure that the financial 
system fulfils its function in the resource allocation process. Although regulation of banks tends to be 
seen as a duty the public sector needs to take on because of the scope for such market failures, some 
commentators argue that many of the aims of regulation could be achieved by affording greater play to 
market mechanisms (Benston, 1991), or that efforts to improve information flows could substantially 
reduce the scope for market failures (Dermine, 1994). The fact remains that banks have long been 
subject to extensive regulation, even though this regulation is not always rooted in sound conceptual 
analysis of relevant risks and costs (Tirole, 1994). 
 
Two broad approaches to prudential supervision are adopted in the EU, exemplified by Belgium and 
the UK.  For the former, the primary justification of prudential supervision is to guard against systemic 
risk, whereas in the UK the legal texts emphasise protection of depositors. From a practical perspective, 
however, the distinction between the two may not always be great because the instruments used to 
achieve the two classes of objective tend to be very similar and it is evident that bank supervisors do 
have to be alert to both aims in exercising their controls. 
 
An extreme view is to regard regulation as an unnecessary market distortion and that competition 
should always be foremost.  Benston (1991), for example, in a critical review of the record of bank 
regulation in the US, argues that systemic risk can, in practice, be avoided by a combination of 
monetary policy and the use of lender-of-last-resort intervention, rendering regulation unnecessary.  He 
concludes that `regulation has overwhelmingly tended to make the banking system and individual 
banks less stable.'  However, many of the points he raises can be attributed more to the type of 
regulation practised in the US, than to weaknesses of regulation per se. 
 
  2.1 Systemic risk 
 
Systemic risk is the textbook reason for prudential controls designed to assure bank solvency. It can be 
defined as the danger that an initial bank failure will spread to other banks in the system. This can 
happen if the failing bank has liabilities held as assets by other banks, with the result that they, in turn, face a deterioration in the quality of their assets which could precipitate a domino effect (Paroush, 
1988) of a run of withdrawals. Failure by one bank may, moreover, engender a lack of confidence that 
affects other financial intermediaries, even if they are not directly implicated. A related, though distinct 
risk is that of contagion within a financial conglomerate which results from one component of the 
conglomerate suffering losses which undermine the viability of the group (Dale, 1992). This can occur 
despite the core banking activity is perfectly sound, the demise of Barings being a prime example.  
 
As the European financial system becomes more integrated, the ramifications of a bank failure will 
inevitably be greater, the more so as leading banks extend their operations across borders and into 
other segments of financial services. This means that the `external costs' associated with a bank run 
would fall not only on the Member State in which the bank was subject to supervision, but also in 
partner countries. In so far as it is appropriate that supervision be carried out by the tier of government 
able to internalise the costs of systemic failure, this would argue for conferring responsibility on the 
supranational tier. 
 
  2.2 Protection of depositors 
 
The justification for prudential controls aimed at protecting depositors is, essentially, that depositors 
lack the means to obtain information that would enable them to assess the solvency and viability of a 
bank. The high costs of monitoring stem from the asymmetry of information between depositors and 
bank managers because the large number of small depositors in a bank cannot easily combine to obtain 
such information (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1992).  
 
In a more integrated financial system, an increase in cross-border selling of financial products must be 
expected - indeed, it is part of the rationale for the single market. This could aggravate the asymmetry 
of information between depositors and financial intermediaries and would imply a need for more 
robust supervision. Although the principle of home country control introduces a level playing-field 
from a competition perspective, it leaves a question mark over the motivations of bank supervisors 
when they are not directly accountable to depositors resident in another Member State. Competition 
imperatives and the corresponding national interest might also encourage laxity in supervision in order 
to secure activity in the financial sector. Even if primary responsibility for supervision remains with 
Member State supervisors, this points to a need not only for common rules on supervision and, 
possibly, supranational oversight of Member State supervisors (who supervises the supervisors?), but 
also for cross-border provision for idemnifying depositors. 
 
  2.3 Market conduct 
 
A third consideration in regulation of the banking system is assuring the efficient functioning of the 
financial system.  Efficiency requires the design of a set of optimal regulatory rules that ensure the cost 
of regulation is minimized yet its objectives are achieved.  One function of regulation in this regard is 
to counter the adverse consequences of `market failures' such as excessive concentration of market 
power (especially monopolies or cartels), or a lack of incentive to innovate in the interests of 
customers. The single market measures aimed at deregulating the banking and financial services 
industries plainly have this aim, and there is a clear role for the EU tier in policing competition. 
 
The smooth operation of the payments systems failure is a further important element of the efficient 
functioning of a financial system Dewatripont and Tirole (1992). This is an area in which progress at 
the European level has been patchy and one of the priorities for the coming years will be to advance 
this process. It does, however, raise questions about where responsibility within the ESCB should lie 
for overseeing the system. In principle, this can be left to Member State central banks, but there will 
manifestly be a need for an inter-Member State clearing mechanism. 
 
3   The underlying changes and why they change the position 
 
Major structural changes in the financial services industry worldwide have re-shaped the challenge 
facing bank regulators. After a pause in the early 1990s, the banking and financial services industries are continuing to undergo rapid, wide-ranging internationalization (BIS 1994: 95-9; IMF 1994: 72-5). 
The competitive pressures set free by liberalization are increasing banking efficiency but generating 
greater systemic and institutional risks (IMF 1993: 3-44). Amongst the most significant developments 
with which the banking industry and prudential supervisors must cope are: 
   
  •  The progressive disappearance of restrictions concerned with quantitative, interest rate and terms 
of credit. Demand for credit is increasingly met through the operation of financial markets rather than 
by political or institutional mechanisms. This has given rise to the possibility of credit bubbles and 
crunches. 
 
  •  The development of a much broader spectrum of financial instruments. Many of these are traded 
on markets rather than managed through institutions. This has given rise to the possibility of significant 
disintermediation. It has also made risk management more complex and important - particularly as 
some of the derivative financial instruments now available provide the opportunity for significant 
leverage. Banks have pushed and been pulled into new areas of business activity. 
 
  •  The growth in the institutionalisation of savings. Personal sector savings increasingly take the 
form of investments by pension funds, insurance companies and collective investment institutions. 
This trend has led to banks having to pay more for the deposits they take whilst simultaneously 
creating powerful new potential competitors. 
 
  •  The broadening of the scope of financial businesses. There is a pervasive trend to de-specialization 
of existing financial institutions. In addition there is a significant trend for non-financial institutions to 
enter into the provision of significant financial services. This has led to increased competition for 
existing banks and has also meant that many banks have felt compelled to enter new markets and learn 
new lines of business, sometimes with notably unsuccessful results. 
 
In these circumstances the distribution and co-ordination of supervisory responsibilities has acquired 
substantial  significance. The speed of internationalization, the rate of innovation and the rapidly 
changing scope of financial firms provide a background in which it is only prudent to expect financial 
turmoil to occur. The new European regulatory and supervisory system must prevent such turmoil 
when possible and tackle it promptly if and when it appears. This is no easy task as, by its very nature, 
financial turmoil is unexpected. 
 
  3.1 Supervisory challenges facing the European financial area 
 
The upsurge in multinational banking is an irreversible trend that, itself, poses new challenges to 
regulators (Dale, 1981). Establishment of a single banking market in Europe takes this a stage further, 
and there are several reasons for expecting problems to occur as the European financial area comes 
into being. 
 
First, the area brings together quite disparate financial markets. The financial services industry has 
been highly segmented along national lines and also, in some countries, along product lines. In some 
European Union economies, the financial environment has been highly protected (Greece); in others 
stability has been the norm (Germany); and some have suffered from considerable financial turmoil in 
recent years (Finland, Sweden). Elsewhere, the state plays a significant role at institutional level 
(France), others have been at the cutting edge of financial innovation and internationalization (United 
Kingdom). This very disparity is one of the underlying features likely to cause problems. It also 
provides a key argument behind the existing policy of home country control, namely that national 
supervisors have an unrivalled, intimate knowledge of their own national situation. The corollary of 
this is that it is national regulators which should be left to get on with the supervisory job. However, as 
the integrative and competitive processes initiated by the Europeanization of financial markets get 
underway this disparity is likely to prove an increasing source of potential problems as financial 
structures in some states undergo rapid structural change. As Loehnis (1993: 10) has observed an `area 
where risk of failure is particularly salient concerns the friction of transition to new financial structures' 
(his emphasis).  
A second reason for expecting trouble is that the 4,000 plus commercial and savings banks in the 
European Union are simply too numerous to survive in their present form (EC 1993). The processes of 
consolidation and 'downsizing' are most unlikely to be trouble free, as experience in the United States 
has indicated (BIS 1993: 168-81; White 1992). Furthermore, the banking industry in the European 
Union as a whole is substantially less concentrated than that of the United States whilst the five firm 
concentration ratios in each individual EU country are significantly higher (Baltensperger and Dermine 
1993: 20-1). The Cecchini report (1988) projected that one third of the benefits arising from the 
creation of the single European market would be gained from efficiencies in financial services. The 
creation of a single European financial area is intended to bring about much greater competition. A 
significant increase in concentration at European Union level is also likely as some major banks bid to 
become genuinely pan-European institutions. One certain result is that there will be winners and losers 
from the more open competitive process. As the liquidation of banks may have much broader financial 
and economic consequences it is particularly important that arrangements for the orderly exit of 
unsuccessful firms are thought through in advance. 
 
A third reason to anticipate problems is that there are major structural differences amongst the existing 
national markets. Even such basics as the scale of deposit insurance vary substantially. For example, 
the voluntary Italian scheme covers losses approximately 30 times greater than the £15,000 maximum 
covered by the UK system (Baltensperger and Dermine 1993: 29; Henderson 1993: 146). In addition 
there are basic differences in the principles of organization adopted by different financial systems 
which make harmonisation difficult. As Borio and Filosa (1994: 33) have recently observed 'The 
problem is that devising standards that are appropriate for institutions performing different ranges of 
activities has proved to be a very difficult task: the approaches historically adopted by the relevant 
authorities have been profoundly different'. One outcome of these differences is that a situation has 
been created in which it is easier to operate deliberately opaque corporate structures in order to take 
advantage of information and regulatory gaps between authorities. Such gaps were effectively 
exploited by the Bank for Credit and Commerce International (IMF 1992: 15-6).  
 
A fourth cause for concern is that the new European structure with its emphasis on home country 
regulation may provide incentives for national regulators to transfer problems elsewhere. Vives (1993) 
observes that if the home country is responsible for solvency and the host country for deposit insurance 
then home country regulators have an incentive to be lax as calls on the deposit insurance system will 
be paid by foreign taxpayers. This problem has been mitigated but not eliminated by the adoption of 
minimum European Union standards of deposit insurance (IMF 1993: 40). In addition, it is highly 
likely that different national regulators will have substantially different political priorities concerning, 
for example, job protection and the creation of financial service 'national champions'. 
 
  3.2 Recent supervisory experience: lessons for the EU 
 
Some insights into the potential pitfalls for the EU can be gleaned from the recent difficulties 
experienced in supervising banks in the United States. 
 
3.2.1 US 
 
After four decades of remarkable stability the latter part of the 1980s witnessed a dramatic upsurge in 
commercial bank failures in the United States (see table 2). 
Amongst the first problems with which US banking supervisors were presented as the era of stability 
ended was the effective failure in 1984 of Continental Illinois. At the time, Continental Illinois was one 
of the ten US money centre banks. Its losses and projected bankruptcy caused the Federal Reserve to 
organize a rescue operation which involved acting as a lender of last resort (Davis: 251). As table 2 
illustrates commercial bank failures became common thereafter. Amongst the major reasons 
accounting for this dismal trend were increased economic instability generally (Minsky 1986) and 
specific regional recessions as exemplified by the dramatic downturn in Texas (Hooks, 1994: 2-3). De-
regulation cut intermediation margins as banks were obliged to pay more competitive rates to 
depositors, whilst opening their previously protected markets to greatly increased competition from both other banks and other financial and non-financial institutions. This quickly exposed the mistakes 
of poor quality managements (Smith 1993). Underlying structural changes such as increased 
competition for savers' deposits and dis-intermediation steadily eroded the intrinsic advantages of 
holding a commercial banking license (IMF 1993: 16-21). Some of these factors are currently at work 
in the newly created single European financial area and may well have similar outcomes. The growing 
trend to dis-intermediation, in which the development of the commercial paper market has played a 
significant part, is an example. 
 
At the beginning of the 1980s, commercial paper markets existed only in Australia, Canada and the 
United States. Since then many new national markets and a Euro-market have developed. Commercial 
paper markets have been operating in the United States for many years but the market grew rapidly 
during the 1980s. By the end of the decade the amount of non-financial commercial paper outstanding 
represented 21% of commercial and industrial loans at banks compared with approximately 11 per cent 
in 1980 (IMF 1993:17). The development of commercial paper markets posed a dual threat to United 
States commercial banks during the 1980s. Firstly, it meant that many of their prime corporate 
borrowers ceased to be customers as they found they could raise short term funds more cheaply on the 
commercial paper market. Secondly, this contributed to a significantly changed pattern of bank lending 
with banks increasingly lending to finance real estate transactions and leveraged buy outs. It is only 
since the mid 1980s that commercial paper markets have developed in Europe (see table 2). This 
phenomenon still has a long way to go. As commercial paper markets mature in the 1990s European 
banks will face tighter margins and more difficult competitive conditions. 
 
Other competitive pressures on banks in the United States which may pre-figure European 
developments included the development of the so-called `junk' bond market for non-investment grade 
companies who would, previously, have borrowed money from banks. The development of the 
securitization of traditional bank assets such as mortgages, car loans, credit card loans and leases 
means that competitors could increasingly serve these markets without using the banking system. This 
is forcing a reassessment of the fundamental role of banks in a modern market economy (Fabozzi and 
Modigliani 1992: 319-21). Competition for deposits from money market mutual funds raised the costs 
of banks whilst changes in state and federal laws facilitated competition amongst banks. Non-bank 
banks were established by over 100 major companies and a number, including General Motors and 
Sears, chose to issue credit cards providing extremely effective competition (Smith 1993: 293; White 
1992). In these circumstances some banks chose to tackle their problems by trying to grow out of 
trouble, expanding their nominal assets by taking on ever more marginal credits, particularly in the real 
estate sector which by 1991 accounted for 42% of total bank loans outstanding in the United States 
compared to 28% in 1980 (BIS 1992: 201). All too often, this proved a disastrous strategy (BIS 1993: 
168-81; White 1992). Similar problems have already occurred in Europe. A notable recent example has 
been provided by the travails of Credit Lyonnais in France (The Banker 1994). 
It should be noted that, serious though the upsurge in commercial bank failures was in the United 
States, the most expensive, intractable problem was resolving the savings and loans crisis. This cost the 
United States government an average US $68 billion per year between 1988 and 1991 (BIS 1993: 171). 
There are many thousands of co-operative and savings banks in the European Union which account for 
a significant fraction of banking assets (EC 1993). It may be prudent to pay close attention to their 
regulation and inevitable future restructuring so that Smith's comments (1993: 41) on the United States 
savings and loan debacle do not apply to Europe in future: 
 
`The S&L industry never bothered anybody before the early 1980s. It was fairly inconspicuous, as 
financial industries go, but it nonetheless accounted for about 30% of all insured banking assets in the 
United States. Subject to severe restrictions on its activities by regulation, the industry resembled a 
public utility - highly specialized, local, slow, and unsophisticated outside of its own field. Such 
industries are poorly equipped to deal with the ravages of rare sudden change in market economics.' 
  
One unambiguous, easy to state, hard to practice, lesson from United States experience is that 
regulators need to look ahead. It may be true that regulators inevitably trail market developments in 
terms of new financial instruments as such instruments are often devised precisely to avoid existing 
regulations or to take advantage of differences in regulatory or tax regimes operating in different jurisdictions. But it need not be true that bank supervisors must always trail behind structural 
developments in financial markets. The rapid structural changes being ushered in by the creation of the 
European financial area will have many of the same ingredients as those which affected the United 
States in the 1980s. There are many commercial, savings and co-operative banks, dis-intermediation 
and competition are on the increase, in some countries banks have enjoyed a long period of stability 
and are simply unused to competition and rapid change. European regulatory institutions are not 
automatically destined to follow the path trodden by the United States of which White (1992:10) 
observed: 
 
`...from the 1930s onward, the bank regulatory agencies had relied on a stable economic environment, 
the protected positions of banks and the concomitant levels of implicit capital to help alleviate the 
burden of the safety and soundness of so many banks. When this combination of circumstances 
gradually dissolved, it was almost inevitable that the bank regulatory system would be overwhelmed.'  
 
Another lesson is that it pays to have a fairly straightforward institutional structure for regulation. For 
example, one of the problems experienced in the United States was that some failed savings and loan 
banks and credit unions in Ohio, Maryland and Rhode Island were not covered by Federal Deposit 
Insurance. However, political pressure was such that de facto the depositors received their money 
(White: 19-20). The cost of thrift and commercial bank rescues combined with such experiences in the 
United States have prompted a substantial literature pointing to the danger that regulators may serve 
their own rather than social interests. It has even been argued that this disjuncture between the 
principals (taxpayers) and their agents (regulators) is the key to understanding the regulatory mess of 
the 1980s (Kane 1990). Competing regulators have an incentive to pursue policies which ensure that it 
is their agency which survives and gains power and influence. Concerns generated by regulatory 
capture and the pursuit of regulatory self interest are less widely expressed in Europe. However, the 
European Union will do well to avoid regulatory competition if its main outcome is to be to spawn 
significant principal-agent problems. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the Federal Reserve 
proposed in 1994 that the four agencies responsible for supervising banks in the United States be 
streamlined into one (IMF 1994: 13-4). United States experience in supervision underlines the 
importance of consolidated supervision and provides supporting arguments for the creation of a single 
European wide supervisory authority. 
 
3.2.2 EU and Scandinavia 
 
The experience of the three prosperous Scandinavian economies outside the European Community in 
the 1980s suggests that a combination of financial de-regulation, structural change and economic 
integration can lead to systemic financial crises (IMF 1993: 2-10). For example, Norway had a highly 
regulated economy which then was rapidly liberalized in the 1980s. The results were a disastrous credit 
bubble followed by a systemic crash during which the Norwegian banking system was effectively 
nationalized and loan losses were estimated to equal 4.2% of GDP, whilst government support for the 
banking system cost 2.8% of GDP (IMF 1994: 2-10). Reflecting on the experiences of the 1980s 
Norges Bank, the Norwegian central bank, supported the merger of the Norwegian Banking, Insurance 
and Securities Commission with itself. Its executive board outlined the arguments (Norges Bank 1992: 
144) which included the following: 
 
  •  The earnings and financial strength of financial institutions are strongly influenced by general 
economic conditions including housing and property. 
 
  •  Financial instruments are becoming increasingly complex and thus tightening the interconnections 
between various markets. 
 
  •  The transition to a market oriented regime necessitates more active risk management 
 
  •  The increase in financial transactions means that financial institutions continually hold large open 
positions with each other. The central bank plays a key role in limiting the risk attached to settlements 
in the payments transmission system  
  •  The Norwegian economy is becoming increasingly internationalized and integrated whilst sectoral 
dividing lines have been blurred. 
 
3.2.3 BCCI - is it really relevant? 
 
The main area of banking supervision in which there has been truly significant international agreement 
has been on the international convergence of capital measurement and capital standards. The `Basle 
agreement' (BIS 1988) on bank capital adequacy has been translated into banking practice in all 
internationally significant jurisdictions. A second area to receive detailed, effective attention has been 
that of regulatory gaps generated by the internationalization of financial markets. The existence of such 
gaps and the need to create transparent corporate structures were highlighted by the closure of BCCI in 
July 1991. The story of BCCI is well known and has been discussed at length elsewhere (Bingham 
1992; Henderson: 150-61; Norton: 81-4). From a supervisory perspective, the most important feature 
of the BCCI episode was that it showed that there were serious gaps in the regulation of cross-border 
banking establishments. In particular, it was clear that BCCI was not subject to consolidated, home 
country supervision as under Luxembourg law holding companies were not subject to supervision. The 
deliberately complex, opaque corporate structure created by the BCCI management enabled it to avoid 
supervision by a single authority (IMF 1992: 16-7). The response to the BCCI debacle has been that 
the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, which meets under the auspices of 
the Bank for International settlements in Basle, reformulated the 1975 Basle Concordat. The re-
formulated principles which are now being applied provide, first and foremost, for the supervision of 
international banking groups and banks by a home-country authority that can capably perform 
consolidated supervision (IMF 1993:37). Other lessons learned from the BCCI episode are the need to 
promote greater corporate transparency and information disclosure to supervisors, that auditors should 
play a more pro-active role, that convergence in accounting standards is desirable and that the 
development of international insolvency laws and greater legalism generally are probably inevitable 
(Norton 1993). Kinsella (1995: 97) has recently argued that 'Even with agreed minimum prudential 
standards the EU will be left with a patchwork of different national capabilities. The BCCI debacle 
demonstrated the inherent weakens of such a system.' It is true that a single European authority would 
not have been prey to the regulatory gaps identified in the BCCI case. However, it is far from certain 
that the BCCI experience adds much weight to the case for a European supervisory agency as opposed 
to consolidated host country supervision. The international supervisory response has created a more 
robust system on a global as opposed to merely European scale. Furthermore, the main argument 
underpinning the case for a single European supervisory agency is the need to avoid systemic crises. 
The closure of BCCI, which operated in 70 countries, imposed losses and business disruption on 
depositors and customers. It did not cause systemic disruption within the international banking industry 
generally or within any individual national banking system. The general lessons to be learned from this 
episode seem to be the need to apply the minimum agreed standards of the re-formulated Basle 
Concordat which provide for the operation of effective, consolidated, home country supervision whilst 
providing host and home country authorities with powerful sanctions to ensure that corporate 
structures are transparent.  
 
  3.3 New problems for prudential supervisors 
 
3.3.1 From the advent of the ECB 
 
The creation of a unified monetary system requires the operation of a stable system through which 
monetary policy can be transmitted. Amongst the original tasks foreseen for the future European 
Central Bank was participation `as necessary in the formulation, co-ordination and execution of 
policies relating to prudential supervision and the stability of the financial system'. (Goodhart 1992: 
16).  
  
The possibility exists that national regulators will try to pursue their own rather than social goals. 
National authorities will surely feel a responsibility to national polities. Furthermore they may try to 
shift both the political fall out from unpopular decisions and paying for problems to other European taxpayers. Within the substantial United States literature these possibilities have been widely discussed. 
Boot and Thakor (1993) show that `even a small degree of uncertainty about the quality of the 
regulator can create significant departures from social optima.' Competing regulators can have an 
incentive to delay the closure of a bank and inflate the liability of the deposit-insurance fund. If 
national regulators within the European Union begin to compete this may create problems. Secondly, 
the exercise of lender of last resort facilities is, by its very nature, a major intervention in competitive 
conditions. Such decisions are bound to be highly contentious. Amongst the contentious questions to 
be tackled will be who should take the decisions to intervene? Who should pick up the bill for 
intervention? What macro-economic policies should be followed after intervention? Will the outcome 
unfairly advantage a particular bank or group of banks - particularly any which are playing the role of 
`national champion'. 
 
In this light, consider the events surrounding the 1994 winding up of the leading Spanish bank Banesto 
(Banco Espanol de Credito). In brief, Banesto expanded very rapidly but injudiciously in the early 
1990s. By the end of 1993 approximately 20 per cent of the banks loans were non-performing. In 
December 1993 the crisis came to a head and interim management was installed by the Bank of Spain. 
Over the next few months, the Bank of Spain and major commercial banks shared in absorbing 285 
billion pesetas in losses. In addition 600 billion pesetas worth of problem loans were transferred to the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund. After this, in April 1994, the remnants of Banesto were sold at auction to 
Banco Santander. The result was the creation of Spain's biggest bank with a capitalization of 17.1 
trillion pesetas (IMF 1994: 74). Had this operation been carried out after the creation of a single 
European currency and monetary policy it would have generated significant additional concerns. In 
particular, competitors would have been concerned that the creation of a large, new European bank in 
such a way would have created an unfair competitive advantage by means of a generous taxpayer 
subsidy. Who is responsible for devising and implementing liquidity pooling and loss sharing 
mechanisms. 
 
4 The  way  forward 
 
The various changes in the European financial system point to a number of challenges that bank 
supervisors will have to confront. These will require development of the institutional framework for 
supervisory and pose the question of how extensive an involvement the EU tier of governance should 
have in this area. 
 
  4.1 3 c's and their advantages/drawbacks 
 
As noted above, cross-border arrangements of various strength can be envisaged. US experience 
suggests that co-operation is not enough and that co-ordination poses problems where supervisors have 
differing goals and incentives. It is also instructive that in the development of the US system, it was 
felt necessary to confer some responsibilities on the federal tier of government.Given the way the 
European financial area is developing, the present co-operative arrangement will probably have to give 
way to a more formal setup. There are two broad reasons for this: 
 
  •  First, as banks take on a growing proportion of business from other Member States, the incidence 
of potential `externalities' in jurisdictions outside that of the supervisor will increase1. 
 
  •  Second, the context of systemic risk will become the whole of the European financial system 
rather than the individual Member State. 
 
Formal co-ordination of supervision, whether under the auspices of the EMI or the Bank of for 
International Settlements may be a sufficient answer, especially in the light of the general preference 
articulated in the Treaty for adhering to the principle of subsidiarity. However, there is some danger 
that a system in which Member States are free to set their own standards will encourage an excessive 
watering down of prudential controls in order to secure competitive advantage. Such `supervisor 
shopping' or, to adapt a well-used phrase,`prudential dumping' could increase the prospects of financial 
instability (Norton, 1994)  
Some centralisation of supervisory functions therefore seems warranted. In this regard, it is worth 
distinguishing between different classes of banks. For small bank either operating in a specialist 
`product' or regional market segment, the cross-border implications of their activities will be minimal, 
and their organisation and structure will be specific to that market segment, so that a national 
supervisor will probably be best placed to deal with such a bank. At the other extreme, there is a 
persuasive case for going beyond home country control to make banks which are pan-European in 
scope subject to an EU tier supervisor. This would inevitably raise questions about the nature of the 
supervision and could create problems if banks which compete directly in some market segments were 
subject to different supervisory régimes.  
 
  4.2 Institutional and political constraints 
 
Assessment of the case for involving the supranational tier in prudential supervision cannot rely solely 
on conceptual arguments, because there are political, legal and institutional grounds for caution. The 
political objections are both the most straightforward and the most intractable. Respect for the 
principle of subsidiarity implies that there have to be manifest advantages to justify bringing in the 
higher tier, and it is inevitable that Member States will play down any such suggestion. In these 
circumstances, and particularly in the current political climate in Europe, proposals for change will not 
be well received. 
 
Legal and institutional constraints start from the fact that the Treaty confines itself to establishing the 
ECB and the ESCB. Thus, there is no provision for a stand-alone supervisor similar to the banking 
commissions that operate in some Member States, nor is there any suggestion that bodies other than 
central banks should be part of the ESCB. Yet the open-ended clauses concerning prudential 
supervision are framed only with reference to the ECB and the ESCB. A related point is that 
competition considerations have led to the adoption in the EU of the Second Banking Directive, 
enshrining home country control. Baltensperger and Dermine (1993) argue that although this is sound 
from the perspective of consumers, in that it enhances choice and reduces redundant supervision, it 
increases systemic risk. The problem is that to reverse the thrust of the single market would run 
counter to recent institutional trends. A possible solution is to confer greater powers on the 
supranational tier. 
 
5 Proposals  and  conclusions 
 
Although it would, no doubt, be possible for the EU to persevere with the current arrangements for 
prudential supervision, consolidation of the European financial area is likely to make this increasingly 
unsatisfactory. This leads to the conclusion that at least some supervisory tasks should be shifted 
`upwards' to the European tier. 
 
  5.1 Case for some EU tier competence 
A number of arguments support the case for assigning responsibility for prudential supervision to the 
EU tier. A first is that it would make it easier to assure the stability of the financial system in a period 
of turbulent change. The significance of prudential safeguards in a period of financial liberalisation 
have been underlined recently by Borio and Filosa (1994: 38) `...the serious difficulties encountered by 
some Nordic banking systems have in part reflected the failure to strengthen prudential safeguards 
sufficiently in a liberalised, more competitive financial environment'. 
 
A second major theme is that a major part of the single market programme is to foster the emergence 
of a single European banking and financial area. By its very nature this project will involve major 
structural change. Amongst these changes may well be the creation of pan-European banks. If and 
when such institutions develop it is logical that a European Union wide authority should bear the 
burden of lender of last resort intervention.This gives rise to the most straightforward argument for 
assigning supervisory responsibilities to a European Union wide body. This has recently been 
expressed by Kinsella (1995: 97) as follows: `..there is a need for an EU-wide regulatory authority as a 
natural counterpoint to the single market in financial services'.  
The basic rationale for creating a single market in financial services is to promote competition and gain 
the benefits which will arise from overcoming existing segmentation. Key and Scott (1991) stress that 
the `choice of a rule depends on the interaction between two factors: the manner in which the service is 
provided and the public policy goals underlying the regulation of banking services'. Proponents of the 
two arguments give different weights to the public policy goals of stability and efficiency. Steinherr 
(1992: 3) points out that regulations were largely established to deal with the needs of the past. Here 
we are trying to design regulations for the future. The main brake on the liberalization process has been 
prudential concerns, although these have also been a pretext for residual potection of indigenous 
operators. The issue is to what extent should issues of stability be prioritised over allocative efficiency. 
After all, the fundamental case for de-regulation is that it enables firms to decide on the product mix 
that they think they are best suited to provide and to test the market accordingly. What rules can be 
derived from Borio and Filosa's observation that '...experience indicates that securing the benefits of 
deregulation in terms of greater economic efficiency calls for a strengthening of prudential safeguards 
with a view to limiting the risk of financial instability' (Borio and Filosa: 42). 
 
A third major theme is that economic integration requires the development of a single European 
clearance and settlements system. Such a system will be overseen by the ECB, and will have to 
establish appropriate liquidity-pooling and loss sharing mechanisms to ensure settlement in specific 
systems in the event of a failure to settle on the part of individual participants. As Borio and Van den 
Bergh (1993: 64) argue: `...the most important challenge is introducing appropriate liquidity-pooling 
and loss sharing mechanisms to ensure settlement in specific systems in the event of a failure to settle 
on the part of individual participants .. the resolution of a settlement failure relies excessively on the 
central bank to provide emergency liquidity assistance, to the detriment of transparency and incentives 
for prudent behaviour.'  A corollary will be supranational policing of the financial intermediaries 
involved. 
 
A fourth consideration is that the advent of a single European currency and a European Central Bank 
will mean that prudential supervision will be much more remote than at present from monetary policy. 
In this regard, an argument for retaining home country control is that it is better to separate monetary 
policy from supervisory policy in case monetary policy is compromised. Gerry Corrigan (1993: 12), 
former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has robustly argued against this  `I will 
concede that in the short run, the potential for such conflicts exist. But in my experience I have never 
encountered a situation in which that potential became a reality to the detriment of monetary policy. 
Moreover at the end of the day, that potential conflict disappears because price stability and financial 
stability become opposite sides of the same coin. That is why the central bank, in my judgment, has an 
inherent and ongoing interest in supervisory policy and practice.' This argument, which stresses the 
synergies between monetary policy and supervisory practice provides a further rationale for creating a 
European Union level supervisory authority which would then form part of the operation of the future 
European Central Bank. After a decade of dealing with difficult supervisory problems, the US Federal 
Reserve has argued that the central bank responsible for monetary policy should be the lead supervisor 
for banks (IMF 1994:14). Amongst the reasons put forward for this position are that: 
 
  •  The central bank's role in resolving financial crises makes it imperative for it to have a close and 
continuous knowledge of the position and workings of banks - knowledge that can only be gained from 
hands on supervision2. 
 
  •  When the central bank has close proximity to markets and to banks there are important synergies 
for the formulation of monetary policy because the central bank will be more sensitive to key financial 
sector developments. For example, the Federal Reserve argues that its supervisory role helped it to be 
more sensitive to the credit crunch in 1991-2.  
 
  •  The central bank's supervisory role makes it easier for the central bank to get information useful 
for monetary policy from banks. 
 Finally, it may be argued that divided regulatory responsibilities will cause confusion and problems of 
regulators pursuing their own rather than broader social goals. It is important to establish explicit 
responsibility for managing crises before they happen. Not only must it be clear who is responsible but 
also who pays. Institutional arrangements such as whether supervision should be a task of the ECB or 
whether there should be a separate commission will matter, but are probably of secondary importance. 
 
 
The duty of prudential supervision invests the responsible authority with considerable power of 
intervention. It is best to recognise at the outset that this will inevitably lead to controversy. In the 
establishment of the European Central Bank close attention must be paid to the parameters within 
which the Bank will be able to exercise its discretionary powers. Initially, the Bank will operate on the 
basis of the guidelines and accords already agreed under the auspices of the Bank for International 
Settlements. However, these rules do not provide a deterministic framework within which decisions on 
lender of last resort intervention are always clear. Recently, the contrast in the response of the Bank of 
England and the Bank of France to the travails of Barings and Credit Lyonnais respectively have 
shown how wide the power of discretion is in practice (The Banker 1995).  
 
It is likely that the anticipated pace of change in the European banking and financial industry will 
generate some specifically regional/national problems which will become of European wide 
significance because of their potential cost and wider economic impact. During the 1980s in Texas, for 
example, extensive, costly assistance was provided by the Federal authorities to institutions which 
failed in specific states due to a combination of local economic circumstances, mismanagement and 
inappropriate regulation. Within the European Union such extensive intervention would be much more 
problematic because the Union lacks the cohesion and legitimacy conferred by nation- statehood. In 
these circumstances, the rules within which the ECB is to operate assume greater significance as 
discretionary decisions are more likely to be challenged on potentially highly divisive, national 
grounds. One response to this is to design the ECB with an explicitly Federal structure which provides 
for European wide supervision of a limited number of institutions which pass certain tests connected 
with size and operational scope within the EU. An agreed framework of rules from the outset within 
which discretionary intervention might take place would confer legitimacy on the operations of the 
Bank or other supra-national agency responsible for prudential supervision. A further way of 
enhancing the Bank's legitimacy would be to design the ECB as a Federal institution which would 
operate in such a way that supervisors based in institutions within the individual EU states would retain 
the first responsibility for supervision and intervention for the great majority of institutions. A 
corollary of this is that the ECB will be accountable both to a European wide institution (Council of 
Ministers or European Parliament for example) and have a duty to, at least, report to national 
parliaments. One difficulty, however, is that only the ECB and the ESCB are given legal standing in 
the Treaty. If there is to be supranational supervision within the existing institutional structure it would 
probably have to take this route. This implies some problems in integrating the separate supervisory 
authorities into the ESCB in those member states where the Central Bank does not formally supervise 
financial intermediaries. 
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  Table 1   Supervision of credit institutions in EU Member States 
 
Member State  ³Agency responsible for  ³Remarks 
 ³prudential  supervision  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Austria  ³Ministry of Finance  ³Banks are required to report to Central Bank 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Belgium  ³Banking Commission  ³One of six Commissioners is from the Central Bank 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Denmark  ³Supervisory Authority  ³Accountable to Ministry of Industry 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
France  ³Banking Commission  ³Chaired by Central Bank Governor 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Germany  ³Supervisory Office  ³Advisory and consultative role for Central Bank 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Ireland  ³Central Bank  ³Central Bank also supervises other intermediaries  
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Italy  ³Central Bank  ³Central Bank has other supervisory tasks 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Luxembourg ³Monetary Institute  ³In process of becoming a fully-fledged Central Bank 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Netherlands  ³Central Bank  ³Central Bank also regulates banking sector 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Portugal  ³Central Bank  ³Central Bank also supervises money markets 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ Spain  ³Central Bank  ³Central Bank has other supervisory tasks 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Sweden  ³Supervisory Authority  ³Autonomous body accountable to government 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
UK ³Central Bank  ³Supervision overseen by Board of Banking 
  ³  ³Supervision which has six independent members 
 
  Source: Derived from information in House of Commons (1993) 
 
  
 
Table 2  Commercial bank failures in the United States 
 
Year    Number of failed   Failed bank assets 
      banks each year    as a % of all bank assets 
 
1950-9    10.5     0.01 
1960-9    2.7     0.08 
1970-9    7.7     0.08 
1980   10     0.01 
1981   10     0.24 
1982   42     0.53 
1983   48     0.31 
1984   79     0.32 
1985   118     0.32 
1986   144     0.26 
1987   201     0.31 
1988   221     1.14 
1989   206     0.88 
1990   159     0.41 
1991   108     1.27 
 
Source: White (1992:2) 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3  Domestic and international markets for commercial paper  
    (In billions of US dollars at end 1992 exchange rates) 
 
Market   Market   1986   1989   1992 
    O p e n i n g  
 
Belgium 1990-  -    1.3 
Finland  1986  0.4    5.3  3.8 
France  1985 4.3    23.4 31.3 
Germany 1991-  -      10.2 
Netherlands  1986  0.1    0.8  2.6 
Spain  1982  7.3    8.0  29.3 
Sweden  1983 3.6    14.0 16.6 
UK 1986  0.8    5.4  6.9 
 
Euro-commercial   mid-1980s  14.7   63.6  78.7 paper 
 
Japan 1987-    104.8  98.1 
United States  pre-1960  326.1  521.9                      544.9 
 
Source: (Alworth and Borio 1993:12) 
 